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 This article deals with the problem of agents’ coordination, and with its treatment through game 
theory. Contrary to most works published on the subject, the emphasis is made on the process rather than 
on the final coordination’s outcome. 
The problem of coordination concerns a group of individuals - or organizations - which pursue 
their own interests and try to establish a new and more efficient convention, i.e. a new behavioral 
regularity. The study of the coordination process allows us to have a better view of the different 
phenomena implicated in the determination of the final outcome and to understand their influence on it. 
Our starting point is the observation that individuals, because of their group membership, will influence 
each other. 
We shall try to show, how, in an uncertain universe, these interactions can contribute to learning 
on both sides, thus modifying the knowledge and then, the strategies of individuals in the emergence of 
an agreement. 
 At the moment, game theory constitutes, one of the tools which is the most used in the treatment 
of coordination problems. Game theory deals with cases in which individuals make choices in 
interaction, and must be able to determine the equilibrium on which the coordination will be made. 
However, in many cases, it is not possible to choose one equilibrium rather than an other. It implies 
either to use equilibrium refinements which impose additional stability criteria to reduce the field of 
possible outcomes or to obtain irresolution.  
 To study a process, we need to be within a dynamic framework, that is to postulate that 
individuals’ choices are not simultaneous but sequential (players observe the past play before decision 
making). We also need to postulate incomplete information because individuals have no reason to know 
in every detail how the other members of the group choose their strategies. Therefore, individuals (i.e. 
players) have prior beliefs about the types of other players. According to the information they dispose 
from each play, players will have the possibility to update their expectations and beliefs. Usually, the 
updating process follows the Bayes rule (the Bayes rule determines the posterior probability that a player 
follows a particular type). This rational process of belief updating is the natural way, in game theory, to 
introduce a learning process. One of the main point we want to make in this article is to know if learning 
phenomena are limited to this unique bayesian process. 
To answer the question, we start by questioning Schelling’s works (1986). Indeed, T. Schelling 
maintains that in the research process (in a tacit way) of a common solution such as the meeting point 
problem, « imagination often dominates reasoning and pure logic... ».[Schelling, T., 1986, p.83]. T. 
Schelling also emphasizes the behavior of the population as a whole, as well as the influence of 
population coordination on individual decision making. « The force of many social behavioral rules (...) 
stems from the fact that they constitute the solution of a coordination game. Everyone thinks it would be 
respected by others, the contrary would imply that deviant players would be pointed at by society. 
Fashion in clothes or also in cars arises from a process in which nobody wants to remain outside of the 
emerging majority and cannot go against the course of events » [Schelling, T., 1986, p.122]. For T. 
Schelling, learning is not exclusively produced by rational calculation, other processes seem to put 
pressure on the decisions of the agents. We want to know what these pressures are, where they take 
place, but also which models of evolution they follow. Then, we try to see if evolutionary games 
constitute the appropriate tool of formalization.  
 Through this paper, we expect to go beyond the usual presentation of coordination in game 
theory (section 1) and to integrate learning processes (section 2) as well as the evolutionary processes 
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able to operate on coordination (section 3). To conclude, we examine the question of a possible 
complementarity, or of a contradiction between the different approaches of learning (section 4). 
 
Section 1 - Coordination of agents in games 
 To study coordination problems, at first, we can consider the simplest framework : a game in 
complete information, where players are able to anticipate the strategies of their opponents. Usually, 
coordination can be seen through three types of basic games : the game of pure coordination, the Battle 
of sexes and the prisoners’ dilemma. In the one shot games, rationality is the only element which guides 
the choices of players. Rationality ensures convergence towards an equilibrium (a). After such an 
analysis, the resolution of some of the leaving problems can take place thanks to the repetition of the 
initial game, when it is possible. The repetition of the game introduces some new informative elements 
for the players (b). 
a) Different kinds of coordination 
 Pure coordination games consider players without conflicts of interest. The equilibrium behavior 
is then necessarily a Pareto-optimal situation. The example often used to illustrate this kind of game is 
the case of two individuals trying to meet each other in a particular town, on a given time, without any 
precise place of meeting. As an example, in the following table, neither of the two equilibria is better 
than the other, both of them correspond to the choice of a same place by the two players. There isn’t any 
obvious answer to this coordination problem : 
 
player 2 
  place A place B 
player 1 place A (1,1) (0,0) 
 place B (0,0) (1,1) 
Table 1 - Example of a pure coordination game from J.W. Friedman (1993). 
 
 Other types of coordination problems are related to the battle of sexes game. This game is 
illustrated by the case of a (married) couple, in which the husband and the wife have different 
preferences concerning their weekly day off. They are supposed to make their choices simultaneously, 
without any communication. If their choices don’t fit, they don’t go out. The different possibilities are 
illustrated in table 2 : 
 
wife 
  match concert 
husband match (2,1) (0,0) 
 concert (0,0) (1,2) 
Table 2 - Example of the game battle of sexes from J.W. Friedman (1993). 
 
 This game has two Pareto optimal equilibria (in pure strategy) when both players choose the 
same alternative. But neither equilibrium is dominated by the other. Even in mix strategy, coordination is 
not ensured. 
 Finally, there is a third way to appreciate coordination problems : the game of the prisoners’ 
dilemma. Two individuals arrested without evidence have two possibilities : to confess the crime and to 
have a risk of punishment, or not to confess. In the latter case the behavior of the other player can be 
harmful to the one who did not confess, or on the contrary be favorable if he confesses. Table 3 
illustrates this situation : 
player 2 
  confess not confess 
player 1 confess (2,2) (9,0) 
 not confess (0,9) (5,5) 
Table 3 - Example of the prisoners’ dilemma from J.W. Friedman (1993). 
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 This game admits a unique equilibrium (2,2) when both players confess. However, it is 
inefficient. They could have obtained (5,5) if neither of them had confessed. The problem is to know how 
to incite players to act jointly and take benefit from higher payoffs. 
 In this last case, as in the previous coordination problems, a way to assume coordination between 
players is to consider a repeated game. 
b) Repetition of the game and starting of coordination 
 If they are repeated either an infinite or an uncertain number of times, repeated games are able to 
incite players to coordinate themselves on Pareto-optimal issues at each play. 
For example, in the prisoners’ dilemma (table 3), players can agree on playing the cooperative 
issue, except on the last play, if the game is finite. The credibility of this proposition relies on the 
capacity of players to punish the ones who deviate from the cooperative issue. Indeed, repeating the game 
offers the possibility for players to achieve their threats against the deviant ones. But this can only be 
possible if threats are credible, i.e. if they do not imply for the one who makes them a payoff loss. 
Consequently, the perfect equilibrium, which is the equilibrium outcome of a repeated game may admit 
the cooperative solution. In the case of an infinite repeated game, the cooperative strategy can even be an 
equilibrium solution if the discount factor is low (the importance of the present is weak compared to that 
of the future) [see R. Axelrod, 1984]. This condition strenghtens the importance of gains that arises from 
the cooperative choice. 
 In the same way, in the first problem (the meeting point - table 1), individuals who come to meet 
each other regularly without the possibility to communicate, will be able to coordinate their actions on a 
stabilized point, after a trial-and-error process (then repeated games belong to dynamic games). In this 
type of game, players can focus their attention more easily on one of the equilibrium of the game, 
because it has a strong meaning in the common background of players, or because it constitutes a 
common convention or a recognized way to play : we talk about focal point. This notion of focal point is 
then an additional equilibrium selection criterion in a situation of multiple equilibria and initiates 
coordination. But, the determination of a unique focal point isn’t always possible. Moreover, when a 
focal point pre-exists, its results are rarely optimal, because it has few opportunities to be suited to the 
particular situation considered. J. Farrell & M. Rabin (1996), who made this remark, proposed to use 
« cheap talk » (which we shall examine later and which assumes incomplete information but possibilities 
of communication). 
 Nevertheless, the repetition of a game does not always result in coordination. It often yields 
multiple equilibria2. These limits have to be taken into account. But we will remain within this 
framework which enables us to study learning processes which can initiate coordination between 
individuals.  
 
Section 2 - Learning in repeated games, resolution of coordination problems and limits 
 Since we assume incomplete information in repeated games, individuals have sought to 
reconstitute their information in order to be able to make good decisions. They are not even capable, as in 
classical game theory, to anticipate the entire path of the game. Therefore, they participate in a dynamic 
game. The dynamic aspect introduces memory effects in the game, i.e. past choices influence present 
decisions. Communication, pre-coordination, updating beliefs, etc. then constitute as many possible 
means to reach better coordination results. 
a) Interactions, learning and coordination 
 We have to distinguish different levels of interactions between individuals. The first one is the 
process by which individuals seek to identify the players’ type. This process will be called learning, just 
as the models describing these kinds of mechanisms. By learning, they mean the process by which 
players update their beliefs and their knowledge systems about other players, as they acquire new 
information on the players’ type (from a more general viewpoint, learning shows the evolution of 
behaviors, beliefs, etc. after the cumulation and assimilation of experience implying the pursuit of some 
actions and the drop or the modification of others). We present what such learning models are, their 
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characteristics and the different ways to describe them. Thus, we shall try to have a better understanding 
of how this learning can contribute to the resolution of coordination problems. 
1. Learning models in repeated games and simple learning 
For D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine (1996) a learning model can be define as «  any model that 
specifies the learning rules used by individual players, and examines their interaction when the game (or 
games) is played repeatedly ». The appropriate framework to study learning is repeated games or more 
generally dynamic games, because they include time in their analysis. Bayesian games satisfy this 
definition of learning models with the Bayes rule as learning rule. 
A simple way to study learning is to consider a two-person game played repeatedly, « ... in such 
an environment, players ought to consider not only how their opponent will play in the future, but also 
about the possibility that their current play may influence the future play of their opponents » [D. 
Fudenberg and D.K. Levine, 1996]. A player can thus « teach » his opponent to play a best response by 
playing a particular action over and over. D. Fudenberg et D.K. Levine consider the following example : 
« a sophisticated and patient player facing a naive opponent can develop a reputation for playing any 
fixed action, and thus in the long run obtain the payoff of a  Stackelberg leader3 ». 
player 2 
  L R 
player 1 U (1,0) (3,2) 
 D (2,1) (4,0) 
Table 4 - Basic learning game from Fudenberg & Levine (1996) 
 
 If player 1 plays as if he was in a one shot game, he chooses D. If player 2 observes that 1 has 
played D, he chooses L, so the system converges in (D, L). But if player 1 is patient and knows that 2 is 
naïve (which means that he chooses at each period the payoff maximizing action by expecting player 1 
action), then player 1 can obtain better outcomes playing U bi inciting player 2 to play R [D. Levine & 
D.K. Fudenberg, 1996, p.6]. 
2. Characteristics of learning models 
Characteristics of most of the learning models in game theory can be synthesized in table 5 : 
 Learning models 
Level of individuals’ 
aggregation 
individual 
(sometimes) population 
Level of players’ 
rationality, cognitive 
capabilities and learning 
sophistication 
 
Rational individual, reasoning capabilities (optimization), expectation 
capabilities, beliefs formulation from priors. 
Possibilities of sophistication depending on the model’s capacity to 
read the past 
Selection criteria of the 
solution 
 
Perfect (bayesian) equilibrium : at each informational set the player 
chooses an optimal behavior (given the players’ beliefs - determined 
by the Bayes rule) 
Use of available 
information 
Reference to the experience cumulating by the players themselves 
during their meetings. 
Table 5 - Synthesis of some characteristic elements of learning models 
 
 Learning is based on the game history’s knowledge of the players (which constitutes the source 
of information for updating) and, on the players’ rationality (rationality ensures strategies to be best 
responses). In an incomplete information environment, players only know the extensive form of the game 
and their own payoff functions. They are unaware of their opponents’ possible issues. In such a situation, 
from one step to an other, players only learn the distribution of strategies used by their opponents. If 
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players obtain information concerning their opponents’ payoffs, they use it to establish prior beliefs on 
the way they are waiting to play4.  
We can also distinguish different levels of aggregation of individuals, and then different levels of 
learning sophistication :  
a)  in the first case, players just try to anticipate how their opponents will play (individual model). If they 
play repeatedly together, they have to take into account that their present game will influence the 
future game of their opponents (cf. game table 5). In such repeated game models, the incitement to fail 
is weak. 
b)  In the second case, the focus is on a large population, where people interact anonymously. The size of 
the population is large enough compared to the discount factor (indicating the relative importance of 
the future from a present perspective). « There are a variety of models, depending on how players 
meet, and what information is revealed at the end of each round of play »5 [D. Levine & D.K. 
Fudenberg, 1996, p.6].  
Most of the individual learning models are bayesian models. Bayesian players only seek to learn 
their opponents’ type. Because those models are individual, players use their own experience and not the 
observation of the population’s experience to learn. Prior beliefs constitute a basis from which the 
learning is made (in the last section, we will try to see what imply priors). They « specify the 
probabilities with which Nature chooses the type of the players at the beginning of the game » [E. 
Rasmusen, 1994, p.145]. Then, beliefs are updated with the Bayes rule (see below). The updating process 
permits to check the validity of players’ expectations. 
 
Rule of Bayes  
p s m p s p m s p s p m si j i j i k j k( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= ∗ ∗∑  
p s mi j( ) : probability that the player i’s strategy is « si  » when the message « m j  » is observed. 
p si( ) : probability that the strategy of player i is « si  ». 
p s p m si j i( ) ( )∗  : probability that the message « m j  » comes from type « B » 
p m p s p m sj k j k( ) ( ) ( )= ∗∑ : probability that the message « m j  » be sent 
[ from B. Guerrien, 1995] 
 
The revision of beliefs permits to pursue an equilibrium behavior - the solution is called perfect 
bayesian equilibrium. D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine (1996) affirm that agents do not need to be 
completely rational, i.e. to base their inference on a correct model of the world. They can also be naïve, 
and so unaware of the possibility for the other players to learn and to answer to past strategic choices.  
The fictitious play is also a foundational learning model. It’s a myopic adjustment process, 
relying on best response functions. As in bayesian models, players only observe the result of their own 
two by two meetings. As in bayesian models, players are naïve and do not try to influence the play of 
their opponents. But in fictitious play, players’ behavior is not sophisticated (players could be replaced 
by automata). They operate as if they were facing a stationary and unknown distribution of opponents’ 
strategies and choose a best response depending on the historic frequency of the game (relating the 
opponents’ actions in the entire past). Their beliefs rely on that unknown distribution. The strategy of 
players is then a deterministic best response function of their past observations. 
Fictitious play had been used, at first, as a preplay calculation game of equilibrium, providing a 
way for players to coordinate their expectations on a particular Nash equilibrium. Fictitious play is now 
considered as a learning model [K.Sigmund & P.H.Young, 1995]. « It consists of nothing more that 
seeing what happens in the long run when the game is played by robots programmed to use the trial-and-
error adjustment process. [...] Thus each robot computes the frequency with which an opponent has used 
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a pure strategy in the past, and optimizes on the assumption that the pure strategy will be used with that 
probability at the next stage » [K. Binmore, 1992, p.409]. 
We can notice that by studying unsophisticated players, fictitious play and its best response 
dynamic can be compared to the replication dynamic used in evolutionary games6 (seen below). 
b) Need of signalling communication, pre-coordination and coordination 
 Within an incomplete information environment, players can’t perfectly anticipate the behavior of 
all the game’s participants. An additional interaction structure can be used between players : signalling 
communication. To describe this element, we can use the game of « cheap talk ». As E. Rasmusen 
noticed it, « Cheap talk refers to costless communication before the game proper begins » [E. Rasmusen, 
1994, p.76]. This costless communication is able to reduce the inefficiency of the equilibrium in a 
conflict contest, as in the battle of sexes. A sender (S) sends a message to a receiver (R), which informs 
the latter about S’s type. Then, the receiver chooses an action depending on the nature of the message he 
received. This action implies the final payoffs of the two players whereas the message has no direct 
effect. However, the message can modify R’s belief on S’s type, and then modify R’s action, which 
influences players payoffs. The « cheap talk » equilibrium is a perfect bayesian equilibrium. But, the 
message which is sent has no need to be informative. S can lie about his real preferences. In that case a 
« cheap talk » communication has little value, and introduces the question of the credibility of messages. 
« A message that is both self-signaling and self-committing seems highly credible » [J. Farrell & M. 
Rabin, 1996]. If those characteristics are of common knowledge, « cheap talk » is able to resolve the 
coordination problem. If there are conflicts, the credibility of the messages is less easy to ensure, firstly 
because players get better payoffs from being selfish (against self signaling) and secondly because the 
sender has no interest to follow what he said (against self committing). In such a situation, even if 
individuals would have an interest to coordinate themselves, « cheap talk » does not ensure they attain 
the most efficient equilibrium. 
 A communication between players can arise through a pre-play game before the real game. This 
phase gives the opportunity for each player to announce his intentions before playing. If the pre-
coordination phase is long enough, players have the possibility to reduce the divergence between players’ 
strategies.  
Precommitment is another form of communication : in that case players choose to commit at the 
start of the game on a strategy for the rest of the game. Then, precomitment implies different results from 
the perfect equilibrium [E. Rasmusen, 1994, p.129]. 
c) Some limits of learning models 
 For us, a set of restrictive hypothesis constrains the scope of the learning models we have 
presented. They postulate for example, that the state of the world is fixed. This hypothesis implies that 
only the marginal processes of change are considered. The learning extent and possibilities of individuals 
seems then strongly reduced.  
An other limit is due to the probabilistic environment of the analysis, which is able to treat risk 
matters, and not uncertain phenomena. Moreover, the priors, on which beliefs are grounded, are given. 
One of the consequence of this hypothesis is that if messages contradict prior beliefs, they will not be 
modified. Once again, we observe that the kind of change studied is only an incremental one. 
It seems that these limits are needed to conceive learning as the result of a rational behavior. 
Thus, L. Blume et D. Easley (1993) propose to pay more attention to how learning interacts with other 
dynamics and then withdraw from the limiting rational learning dynamics. They try to show « ... that in a 
simple economy, the forces of market selection can yield convergence to rational expectations equilibria 
even without every agent behaving as a rational learner » [E. Blume et D. Easley, 1993]. In the next 
sections, we try to emphasize such learning dynamics, and more precisely to see if evolutionary models 
can contribute to the emergence of an agreement. 
 
Section 3 - Evolutionary models and coordination 
 In fact, there exists other models relying on different dynamics (than the ones we’ve seen) and 
also on different hypothesis concerning the players’ behavior and possibilities of action. It is the case of 
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evolutionary games, where the players considered are pre-programmed entities without any possibility to 
choose their strategy. The selection mechanism follows replication dynamics. The equilibrium concept is 
the notion of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). The learning models we’ve described in the previous 
section, were adjustment processes of beliefs, expectation and information’s interpretation. For example, 
in bayesian models the learning’s object was usually players’ type. This learning could serve to reduce 
individual uncertainty to coordinate themselves. But, do coordination exclusively result from the 
reduction of uncertainty? Certainly not. We think that evolutionary models participate to a larger 
understanding of this concept. In the case of coordination problems, they become interested in the 
equilibrium emergence process. The equilibration process is guided by the following rule : the strategies 
that constituted good answers in the past will be played in the next period by a larger number of players. 
In games with multiple equilibria, the convergence process toward an equilibrium is strongly linked with 
initial conditions : then we can say that there is a strong path dependency. And, the notion of equilibrium 
corresponds to a strategy profile such that no player with a new strategy can invade and receive a higher 
payoff than the first player. 
a) Evolutionary games, selection, heritage, mutation 
F. Vega Redondo (1996) described evolutionary models as specific dynamic processes 
characterized by particular forces : selection, heritage and mutation. Selection is a force that determines 
the survival opportunities and the reproduction success of individuals following a particular behavior. 
Heritage is a « force that relies (upon a) behavioral model through consecutive generations ». For an 
effective selection, heritage has to ensure the transfer of a behavior from one generation to another in a 
sufficiently stable way. The mutation is a force generating new behaviors, able to improve the previous 
behavioral model and adapt it to the environment. It can be defined as « the repeated introduction (either 
deterministically or stochastically) of new strategies into the population » [D. Fudenberg et D.K. Levine, 
1996]. 
 Since J. Maynard Smith et G.R. Price (1973) showed that animal conflicts could be treated 
through games, biologists have used evolutionary game theory to study these evolutionary forces. On the 
side of human science, this theory sought to understand the strategies’ evolution of players with very 
limited rationality. Then, evolutionary game theory appears to be on the opposite side of the usual 
framework of game theory dealing with interactions of fully rational players. The goal of evolutionary 
game theory is different. « The goal is not to explain how players would rationally pick actions in a given 
situation, but to explain how behavior evolves or persists over time under exogenous shocks ; Both 
approaches end up defining equilibria to be strategy profiles that are best responses in some sense, but 
biologists care much about the stability of the equilibrium and how strategies interact over time » [E. 
Rasmusen, 1994, p.111]. 
b) Evolutionary models characteristics 
 Table 6 synthesizes evolutionary models’ characteristics :  
 Evolutionary Models 
Level of individuals’ 
aggregation 
large population  
 
Level of players’ rationality, 
cognitive capabilities and 
learning sophistication 
limited rationality, myopic players, following preprogrammed 
strategies. 
 
unsophisticated players 
Selection criteria of the 
solution 
 
evolutionary stable strategy : Nash equilibrium refinement (not as 
strong). This stability concept implies that the ESS is able to repeal 
new strategies invasion. 
Use of available information reference to the past experience of the population. Players guess a 
stationary environment. 
Table 6 - Synthesis of the characteristic elements of evolutionary models 
 
 Evolutionary models are concerned with large populations. Interactions between players may 
result from pairwise meetings (if the game is a two players game) in repeated games [Mailath, 1992]. 
Matching is anonymous and random (at each period, different players are considered). So here, learning 
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is based on players experience, learning through replication dynamic (RD) comes only from the 
population experience [G.J. Mailath, 1992]. Population can be either homogenous (players are almost 
identical - then their behavior is not correlated with players’ identity), or heterogeneous (players belong 
to different sub-populations, and have different roles - for example : buyer and seller...).  
Individuals are myopic and simple, in other words, they do not expect the other players to revise 
their strategy. They act as if they were in an unchanged strategic environment. More than individuals, 
strategies are the reference points. Players do not consciously choose their strategies, they are 
preprogrammed, i.e. each player follows a particular role according to the population he belongs to. 
Players establish neither beliefs or expectations, they do not analyze their previous observations. Their 
strategies are also transmissible. 
The performance criterion used is fitness. The fitness of a strategy i facing strategy j is the 
number of descendants (offspring) of i when j is played. Thus, the fittest behaviors will be reinforced. 
The strategies rewarded are those above the mean fitness, which are not necessarily the best. But the 
players who follow a bad strategy disappear. 
The evolution process is a simple replication dynamic with the following principle : « the share 
of the population using each strategy grows at a rate proportional to that strategy’s current payoff, so that 
strategies giving the greatest utility against the aggregate statistic from the previous period grow most 
rapidly, while those with the least utility decline most rapidly » [D. Fudenberg, & D.K. Levine, 1996, 
p.9]. The replication dynamic « describes how the strategies employed change over iterations, whether 
because players differ in the number of their descendants or because they learn to change their strategies 
over time » [E. Rasmusen, 1994, p. 113]. This evolution is slow, continual, reversible (random) [B. 
Walliser, 1996] whereas usually in economic games, players reach instantaneously equilibrium.  
The concept of solution is the evolutionary stable strategy : « An ESS is a Nash equilibrium 
strategy of a symmetric bimatrix game which satisfies the additional stability requirement that it cannot 
be beaten by any rare, alternative strategy » [E. Van Damme, 1996, p.214]. The ESS is more than a best 
response : it has the highest payoff and it is a best response to itself. An ESS has the capacity to make the 
system return to its initial state after a little shock (E. Van Damme (1996) also shows that the ESS is 
asymptotically stable in the corresponding replication dynamics). What is needed then to know the 
equilibrium is the initial sharing of players in sub-populations, meetings and mutations aleas [B. 
Walliser, 1996].  
Against evolutionary games, Foster et Young (1990) notice that usually, evolutionary processes 
face repeated stochastic shocks and not only isolated shocks as supposed in evolutionary game theory. In 
that case, two shocks can be too close to let the system return to its initial state. The appropriate stability 
notion is then the stochastic stability one. P. H. Young (1993) uses this equilibrium notion to explicit the 
emergence of a conventional equilibrium from the process dynamics. 
 To achieve this rapid description of evolutionary games, we can notice the remark of E. Blume et 
D. Easley (1992) saying that it is necessary to distinguish the evolutionary games in reference to biology 
and human and social evolutionary processes belonging to dynamic economics. In that case, the 
evolutionary aspects are related to the natural selection in markets which favor the optimal decision 
makers’ survival. It is also important to identify divergence between economists and biologists in the use 
of evolutionary games [K. Sigmund & H.P. Young, 1995]. 
c) Evolutionary models and social conventions 
For F. Vega Redondo (1996), evolutionary models provide an appropriate framework to deal 
with individuals with limited capacities of calculation, attention and association, who refer to simple 
rules which operated successfully in the past. On the basis of those past performances, they adjust their 
disposition to choose one of the past rules, as if they were proceeding to an internal (mental) selection. 
Social and economic environment represents an additional level of selection, closer to the biological 
selection process. Environment’s complexity, our informational deficit and our imperfect understanding 
leave a potential for improvement in usable actions and rules. The discovery of novelty can then result 
either from non intentional actions or appears consciously « by combining a limited understanding of the 
problem with random sets of new choices » [F. Vega Redondo, 1996]. Occasionally, a good action can be 
found. It’s then selected, and becomes a part of the present and past choice set. A mutation can also 
affect the evolutionary path of future actions. In absence of mutation, population stays in the same path. 
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But if a mutation exists, and pass the new behavior to his offspring, then the mutant strategy can become 
successful [E. Rasmusen, 1994, p.114]. 
Evolutionary models provide a description of conventional evolution (necessarily slow). 
Convention is considered as the coordination game’s equilibrium, emerging from random interactions of 
limited rationality players. R. Boyer & A. Orléan (1994) studied the problem of emergence of a 
convention using the concept of ESS. In their study, R. Boyer & A. Orléan supposed a large population, 
with random matching. Individuals had to choose between two strategies I and J. The evolution of 
strategies is linked to their relative performance, calculated by players’ expected utility. To become 
evolutionary stable, a strategy needs its expected utility to be strictly above the expected utility of the 
other strategy. If this condition is satisfied, a mutant strategy (associated with a small population) cannot 
destroy the dominant behavior. However, if several ESS exist, the system can be locked in a Pareto-
inefficient situation. The system is then unable to evolve toward an other convention unless the players’ 
percentage of individuals adopting the mutant strategy goes beyond a particular threshold. To resolve the 
problem of equilibria multiplicity, several authors, including R. Boyer & A. Orléan propose to return to 
the random matching hypothesis, and to work on a localized interactions structure. S.K. Berninghaus et 
U. Schwalbe (1996) for example, demonstrated that the coexistence of several conventions in society is 
linked to the anonymous degree in a society, i.e. to the number of common neighbors for two adjacent 
players.  
 After these different remarks, we note that the way we can use evolutionary models to participate 
to the resolution of coordination problems is totally different from the way and the field studied by 
learning models. It seems to be difficult to use replication dynamics to describe individual behavior, 
because the temporal space of both these processes is not compatible. One of the conclusion of an 
experimental work from J.B. Van Huyck & alii. (1996), is that evolutionary models do not provide a 
satisfying representation of individual learning processes, but seem to be suited to the populations’ 
process’ studies.  
However, different works, as the one by R. Boyer and A. Orléan, are based on evolutionary 
models to describe a stabilized behavior’s emergence, refering to the resolution of coordination by focal 
points. Thus, these propositions can probably lead to distinguish the elements contributing to a kind of 
pre-coordination of agents and those which intervene during the coordination process, contributing to 
reduce uncertainty around agents. The first would be studied through evolutionary models, and the 
second ones through learning models.  
 
Section 4 - Between evolutionary models and learning models : which alternative ?  
Learning models and evolutionary models have their own interest. But, neither can by itself 
explain the phenomena described by the other. Then a question still remains : are those processes (the 
evolutionary and learning ones) able to coexist, and if so, what is the nature of their relations ? It seems 
difficult to consider societies exclusively constituted either of « hyper rational » individuals, or of simple 
individuals. The possibility to learn does not exclude the existence of evolution processes, nor the 
capacity of these processes to act on agents’ choices. In this conclusive section, we then think about 
learning and the evolutionary processes interrelations. Through several recent works, we seek for 
identifying the nature of the interrelations (b). But firstly, we can see how the processes can be 
reconciled (a).  
a) Learning and evolution : extremities of a same model ? 
 Some authors are trying to identify the different variables (complexity, population’s size, 
rationality, cognitive capacities...) from which it is possible to distinguish the action fields of learning 
and/or evolutionary processes, and then to bring out their differences.  
 Thus, B. Walliser (1996) constructed a typology of the different types of learning, from the most 
sophisticated type (« eductive process ») to the less sophisticated one (evolutionary processes). He 
established a link between individual learning models and evolutionary learning models, describing 
populations’ behavior. B. Walliser uses the criterion of agents’ cognitive capacities to separate four types 
of learning : (i) - « eductive process » - each agent has enough information to simulate other players’ 
behavior and immediately go to equilibrium ; (ii) - « epistemic learning » - individuals establish beliefs 
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on future strategies of other players thanks to their past actions (bayesian learning) ; (iii) - « behavioral 
learning », each individual changes its strategy according to the payoffs obtained from its past actions ; 
and (iv) - « evolutionary process » - each player has a fixed strategy and reproduces it according to the 
utility obtained through stochastic interactions.  
 D. Levine et D.K. Fudenberg (1996) use the complexity as the relevant variable. They explain 
that because individual models of learning are becoming more and more complex, particularly for large 
populations of players, some works make hypothesis directly on aggregate population’s behavior 
(evolutionary models). We suppose that a non specified process exists at an individual level leading the 
entire population to adopt strategies which improve payoffs. This evolutionary process corresponds to the 
aggregation of plausible learning rules for agents. 
b) Some binding possibilities between learning and evolutionary models  
1. An example of binding between a collective dynamic (convention) and an individual learning process 
(expectation formation) : role of beliefs. 
 In evolutionary models, players’ strategies are pre-programmed. Players who belong to a same 
population follow the same strategy. Isn’t it possible to revise this strong hypothesis, which constrains 
the individuals’ autonomy, and consider only that the element shared by people of a same population is a 
set of common references ? These common references or conventions could influence the way 
individuals interpret their information, but leave them free to use their own reply function given their 
cumulated experience through their multiple meetings in the repeated game. This proposition rejoins P-
A. Chiappori’s thesis (1994), who says that « In general circumstances, not only behaviors, but even the 
very foundations of the agents’ economic knowledge, the representation they have concerning the 
economic context in which they grow, can be of conventional nature ». « (...) An initial convention can 
then fix all the future beliefs of agents - and then all the resulting economic facts ». His conclusion is that 
there is no incompatibility between conventional behaviors and individual rationality. The problem is 
then the coexistence of different conventions : on which convention agents will manage to coordinate 
themselves ? and is it always a common convention ? 
2. Learning from experience or a way to go beyond bayesian learning 
P.M. Brown (1995) sought to show that normative learning models, as bayesian learning do not 
relate all the reality of individual learning processes, and more particularly the existence of learning from 
experience. « Instead of choosing the forecasting rule that minimizes their forecasting errors, the learning 
process can be characterized as searching for a decision rule that promises returns above a subjective 
reference point »[P.M. Brown, 1995]. It doesn’t mean that individual choices won’t be optimal. The 
validity of the model will only depend on the reference point chosen by agents and so, of the payoff 
structure of actions. 
 
3. Example of interaction between learning dynamics and others market selection dynamics : towards 
better results than bayesian learning. 
 E. Blume et D. Easley (1993) studied the question of how individual learning interacts with other 
dynamic forces. They showed that in a simplified economy, market selection forces could induce a 
convergence toward rational expectations equilibria, without postulating a necessary rationality of 
players. They revised the hypotheses (necessary in bayesian learning) that individuals have positive prior 
beliefs on a correct model and behave according to the Bayes rule to update beliefs. These hypotheses, as 
we saw them, are not realistic. They proposed new adjustment dynamics to link temporary equilibria and 
to determine the long run behavior of equilibrium prices. In their simplified model, the additional 
connection comes from the adjustment dynamic of wealth share. In time, individuals prosper and so 
dominate the market. Equilibrium points reflect beliefs. Then there are two possibilities : 
- either learning is reinforced by wealth adjustment dynamics : the individuals with the best beliefs will 
be rewarded by the market and become dominant in the population (if players are bayesian, in the long 
run beliefs will be right, they will dominate the market and the asset will be correctly assesses) ; 
 - or « differences in decision rules more then compensate for differences in learning rules, and so 
rational learners may be driven from the market ».  
 If bayesian learning dynamics and wealth adjustment dynamics complement each other, E. 
Blume et D. Easley (1992) showed that « the higher savings rates of the incorrectly informed traders 
overwhelms the better information of the correctly informed traders ». 
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 Different works of this type seek for a better view on the binding between individual processes 
oriented on decision making and the particular context they belong to, which can be characterized by 
dynamics with mechanisms of selection, heritage and mutation. For instance, we follow P-A. Chiappori 
who considers that the binding is established at that the level of beliefs and the representation agents 
have about their environment. This would be the level on which agents will integrate conventional 
elements in their individual process of learning. 
 Thanks to E. Blume et D. Easley (1993), those mix adjustment processes can lead to better 
results than pure individual learning processes in spite of the informational gap. This open path need to 
be pursued. 
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